Ecological models are a fundamental tool that archaeologists use to clarify our thinking about the processes that generate the archaeological record. Typically, arguments reasoned from a single model are bolstered by observing the consistency of ethnographic data with the argument. This validation of a model establishes that an argument is reasonable. In this paper, we attempt to move beyond validation by comparing the consistency of two arguments reasoned from different models that might explain corporate territorial ownership in a large ethnographic dataset. Our results suggest that social dilemmas are an under appreciated mechanism that can drive the evolution of corporate territorial ownership. When social dilemmas emerge, the costs associated with provisioning the public goods of information on resources or, perhaps, common defense create situations in which human foragers gain more by cooperating to recognize corporate ownership rules than they lose. Our results also indicate that societies who share a common cultural history are more likely to recognize corporate ownership, and there is a spatial dynamic in which societies who live near each other are more likely to recognize corporate ownership as the number of near-by groups who recognize ownership increases. Our results have important implications for investigating the coevolution of territorial ownership and the adoption of food production in the archaeological record.
INTRODUCTION
The sample of societies in their analysis is not large enough to answer such However, Smith (1988) and Kelly (2013, p. 161-162) argue that her results
217
provide a context for extending the area reduction argument rather than a 218 critical test (and we concur). They argue that, holding competition equal, 219 where resources are dense but vary in such a way that the productivity of "competing" group's territories are anti-correlated, there is a net fitness ben-221 efit for individuals to engage in territorial ownership based on social bound-222 ary defense. The key is that the productivity of competing group's territories 223 are anti-correlated, which provides an incentive for individuals in competing 224 groups to recognize each other's ownership claims (Cashdan, 1983; Smith, 225 1988). This is a perfectly reasonable extension of the area reduction argu- 
THE FEM

231
The FEM formally studies the feedback between the fraction of an in- 
242
The FEM describes a baseline forager-resource system. By this we mean 243 that a resource location is treated as open access with the simple rule of 244 'you harvest, you eat. ' We use our knowledge of the model's dynamics to 245 develop an argument that describes the conditions under which a baseline 246 system might change and individuals might cooperate to adopt a corporate 247 rule that restricts access to a territory.
248
The key dynamic in the FEM that is relevant here is as follows. Holding the time necessary to scout and discuss where to move next longer and,
339
depending on how unpredictable shocks are that hit a territory, this process of 340 decision making may be less effective at planning out residential movements.
341
That is, people make a decision about which habitat it is best to move 342 into, but end up in a 'bad spot' (i.e., a degraded harvest state and need 343 to unexpectedly move on). These mechanisms, (more time required to get 344 information and less reliable information) provide an incentive for foragers 345 to adopt strategies for reducing these costs. In this argument, the ownership 346 of territory regulates the movement of foragers in and out of a territory and 347 is beneficial to each individual because it reduces the costs associated with 348 obtaining reliable information on the quality of resource locations. 
PREDICTIONS
370
The purpose of this section is to summarize the predictions that follow 371 from the logic of the area reduction and common pool resource arguments.
372
We highlight predictions that are mutually exclusive because these are key 373 to determining which argument is most consistent with the data. 
Area reduction argument
375
The area reduction argument suggests eight basic predictions (see Table 2 376 below for a summary). First, holding all else equal, as the density of resources to harvest food and the net benefit of territorial ownership should increase.
381
In forager societies, the density of exploited resources is a function of diet 382 (i.e., the foods that foragers primarily target) and the growth rate (biomass 383 growth per unit time) of resources. As biomass accumulates at a faster rate, 384 resource density should increase and the likelihood that hunter-gatherers own 385 territories should also increase.
386
Second, in terms of diet, some argue that aquatic resources (fish and shell 387 fish) provide dense and predictable resources (Hamilton et al., 2007; Sealy, 388 2006) and this allows individual foragers to decrease the size of their territory.
389
If this assertion has merit, the reduction in territory size should increase the 390 net benefit of territorial ownership. Holding all else equal, we might then 391 expect that an increase in the exploitation of aquatic resources increases the 392 likelihood that hunter-gatherer groups own territory.
393
Third, the predictability of resources within a territory is a function of 394 intrinsic variation in the basic physical inputs that determine the productivity Fifth, the area reduction argument suggests that ownership should only 416 occur when there is someone to defend a territory against (Brown, 1964) .
417
Holding other factors constant, as population density increases, the likeli- 
Materials and Methods
525
The ethnographic data used here were compiled from Binford The main difference between categories 2 and 3 is that Binford differentiates 563 the particular resource locations (e.g., a fishing site) over which groups rec-564 ognize corporate ownership that restricts rights of access. He also stipulates 565 that rights of access may be administered by a group leader in category 3. However, the ability to make a distinction between categories 2 and 3 is sus- He goes on to state that personal ownership could be claimed over the sea-575 sonal products of trees and fishing locations (Goldschmidt, 1951, p. 333 ).
576
For our purposes, the fact that the distinction is fuzzy between these two 577 categories is not as salient as the fact that categories 2 and 3 represent def- Five variables are used to evaluate our predictions (Table 1) . Net primary 620 productivity data were obtained from Grieser and colleagues (Grieser et al., 
Methods
656
We use multiple, binary logistic regression to relate the joint probability 657 that a corporate ownership norm is either recorded or not recorded, i.e., such that
wherep is the joint probability that a hunter-gatherer group is recorded to 663 recognize a corporate ownership norm, given a set of explanatory variables.
664
The coefficients in equation 3 describe the effect that a change in an 665 explanatory variable has on the log-odds that a hunter-gatherer group is 666 recorded to own territory. We assume that groups of hunter-gatherer societies Table S1 & S2). These baseline outputs treat each ex-727 planatory variable as an independent variable. However, as noted (Table 2) , 728 we expect that the explanatory variables may interact in predictable ways.
729
To evaluate interaction effects, we followed the above procedure including all in the analysis are highly unlikely to interact.
750
Next, we run our four step procedure (outlined above) running all five 751 independent parameters and the two most likely interaction effects on the 752 probability of ownership. We call this output our "full regression output"
753
(see Table S3 and S4). The best regression model in this analysis includes 754 all seven parameters, the five independent parameters and our two most and net primary productivity also overlap with zero, so we remove these two 765 variables as independent parameters.
766
[ Table 2] 767 Below, we run our four step procedure to obtain what we call our "efficient To evaluate the potential for autocorrelation due to spatial proximity 795 and/or shared cultural histories, we ran our four step procedure to evaluate (Table S5) . We then ran a Moran's I test for autocorrelation on the residual deviances using a weighted distance matrix based on spatial autocorrelation. This suggests that we need to account for spatial and net-806 work autocorrelation to fairly evaluate the area reduction and common pool 807 resource arguments.
808
To insure that our parameters are as free from bias a possible due to au-809 tocorrelation, we use a two stage regression model to incorporate the endoge-810 nous effect of spatial and linguistic proximity into our analysis (Dow, 2008) .
811
We first lag our ownership variable (i.e., multiply our dependent variable
812
vector by a distance matrix) using a weighted distance matrix that combines 
here β is the coefficient associated with the lagged endogenous binary own- 
MAIN RESULTS
841
Our final regression outputs illustrate two main findings. to effect ownership than the density of terrestrial resources, in this data set. teracted with net primary productivity and fishing.
907
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[ Table 4 ] Consistent w/ Data N P P : CV Rainf all A negative effect of CV Rainf all on the likelihood of corporate ownership for a given value of N P P that increases in strength as N P P increases no N P P : Density N P P has a positive effect on the likelihood of ownership; however, below a critical population density threshold (as yet unknown) N P P will have no effect on the likelihood of ownership no CV Rainf all : Density A negative effect of CV Rainf all on the likelihood of corporate ownership; however, below a critical population density threshold, CV Rainf all will have no effect or an extremely weak effect Consistent w/ Data N P P : CV Rainf all A positive effect of CV Rainf all on the likelihood of corporate ownership for a given value of N P P that decreases in strength as N P P increases no N P P : Density As N P P declines, the strength of the negative effect of N P P on ownership should increase as population density increases partly CV Rainf all : Density As CV Rainf all declines (rainfall gets more predictable), the strength of the positive effect of population density on ownership should decline. Population density (people/100km 2 ) Probability of ownership Net primary productivity (g/m 2 /yr −1 ) Probability of ownership 
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